The Value of Fixed-Reimbursement Healthcare Insurance- Evidence from Cancer Patients in Ontario, Canada by Christopher Longo & Michel Grignon
 
 





The value of fixed-reimbursement healthcare insurance – 
evidence from cancer patients in Ontario, Canada. 
 
 
Christopher J. Longo, Ph.D., 
Michel Grignon, PhD., 
 
 
Address correspondence to: 
 
Christopher J. Longo, Ph.D. 
Assistant Professor, Health Services Management, DeGroote School of Business, 
Member, Centre for Health Economics and Policy Analysis, 
McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, L8S 4M4 
Assistant Professor 
Strategic Market Leadership and Health Services Management,  
DeGroote School of Business (DSB-210),  
McMaster University,  
1280 Main Street West, Hamilton , Ontario , L8S 4M4 




Michel Grignon, PhD., 
Associate Professor, Department of Economics 
Department of Health, Aging, and Society, 
Member, Centre for Health Economics and Policy Analysis, 
McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, L8S 4M4 
 CHRISTOPHER J LONGO 
CHEPA WORKING PAPER SERIES 
 
  The Centre for Health Economics and policy Analysis (CHEPA) Working Paper Series 
provides for the circulation on a pre-publication basis of research conducted by CHEPA faculty, 
staff and students.  The Working Paper Series is intended to stimulate discussion on analytical, 
methodological, quantitative, and policy issues in health economics and health policy analysis.  
The views expressed in the papers are the views of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect 
the views of the Centre or its sponsors.  Readers of Working Papers are encouraged to contact 
the author(s) with comments, criticisms, and suggestions. 
 THE VALUE OF FIXED-REIMBURSEMENT HEALTHCARE INSURANCE – EVIDENCE FROM CANCER PATIENTS IN ONARIO, CANADA 
CHEPA WORKINGPAPER 09-03    3             





The value of fixed-reimbursement healthcare insurance – 
evidence from cancer patients in Ontario, Canada. 
 
Christopher J. Longo, Ph.D., 








Centre for Health Economics and Policy Analysis 
Health Sciences Centre, HSC 3H1D 
McMaster University 
1200 Main St. West 
Hamilton, Ontario, Canada 
L8N 3Z5 
Email: clongo@mcmaster.ca 
Phone: 905-525-9140 ext. 23896CHRISTOPHER J LONGO 
CHEPA WORKINGPAPER 09-03 
 
4 





Critical illness insurance (CII) is a fixed-reimbursement scheme conditioned on the event 
of a loss, not the size of the loss. We investigate demand for CII. Consumers will be willing to 
purchase CII depending on their degree of risk aversion to the cost of treating illness, their 
forgone income, and desire for being compensated for utility loss when sick. Using a theoretical 
model based on Eeckhoudt (2003), we run simulations using Canadian data for CII policy 
reimbursement dollar values of purchases, family income, cancer expenditure, and net wealth. 
We then evaluate how well these models predict actual CII purchases.  
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Introduction 
A variety of healthcare insurance products are available in the market today.  Each offer 
unique benefits, and can be effective in mitigating risk for the insured who desire protection from 
the high cost of health care services, and their impacts on personal savings and future income 
streams. Yet each of these healthcare insurance products is administered in different ways, and 
the result is that specific insurance products have high demand in some markets and little or no 
demand in others. Some discussion of the fundamental motivations, for both the insurer and the 
insured, underlying these different healthcare insurance models is presented to allow the reader 
to more fully appreciate the value of different healthcare insurance policy purchasing choices
1
Health and illness present a variety of financial uncertainties for the general population. 
First, there is uncertainty in the occurrence and severity of the illness or health status 
deterioration; we will call this “severity uncertainty”. Second, there is uncertainty in the medical 
cost of treatment (the amount of the loss) in case of full recovery; we will call this “loss 
uncertainty”. Third there is uncertainty in the probability of recovering; we will call this “recovery 
uncertainty”. Fourth there is some individual variation in the non medical cost of the treatment 
and the illness itself; we will call this “non-medical uncertainty”.   In considering the variety of 
healthcare insurance products we need to evaluate which of these uncertainties the product is 
designed to address. 
. 
A general healthcare insurance scheme provides coverage for severity uncertainty and 
some of portion of loss uncertainty, but little if any coverage for recovery or non-medical 
uncertainty. General healthcare insurance is in this way similar to auto insurance; the policy will 
cover the costs of repairing the damage due to an uncertain event and these costs might vary 
around the mean with some characteristics that are beyond the control of the insurer. However, 
in auto insurance  the amount of uncertainty is limited by stop-loss provisions in the policy 
(maximum reimbursed cost) as well as conditioning reimbursement (the insured is not 
reimbursed if it can be observed that the “incident” was due to his negligence or behavior or if it 
is found ex post there is no “event”). General healthcare insurance typically does not have these 
kinds of stop-loss provisions, for obvious demand-side reasons, and, moreover, the range of 
potential costs can often be much wider than in most other types of insurance. As a result, 
general healthcare insurance policies work as a price pay-off scheme through which the insured 
buy a right to discounted health care services and are subject to moral hazard (of insured) that 
                                                 
1 This discussion borrows extensively to Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000), Glied (2000), Nyman (2003), Pauly (2000), 
and Zweifel and Manning (2000). CHRISTOPHER J LONGO 
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increases total payout and costs
2. A consequence of moral hazard is that the price of insurance 
(the loading fee) might become too high and some individuals will be unable to afford the level 
of coverage their risk aversion would suggest they prefer. To counter these effects of moral 
hazard on the cost of coverage general healthcare insurance policies use standard tools such 
as co-payments and deductibles. However, because the demand for coverage for catastrophic 
cases and repeated events (the so-called premium risk) is much stronger in health than in other 
types of insurance
3
In most healthcare insurance  cases the amount of the loss  due to non-medical 
uncertainty is known to the insured but cannot be priced before the fact by the insurer; it is the 
result of decisions and behaviors of the insured and the insurer cannot rely on any agent to 
control and limit the insured.  Additionally there may be costs beyond the actual medical care 
that are particularly relevant yet unaddressed by these general healthcare insurance policies. 
One such cost is that of forgone income if the individual can no longer participate in the labor 
force due to their condition or because of the treatment
, these demand-side mechanisms to control moral hazards cannot apply as 
fully in healthcare insurance as in automobile or other damage insurance policies. As a result, 
the insurer must rely on health care providers as agents to control the amount of the loss as well 
as on a strict definition of the goods and services the insurer reimburses, through the formulary 
for drugs or utilization review for hospital procedures. A consequence is that some components 
of the cost of the treatment such as access to the latest technology (when standard alternative 
treatments exist and are covered by insurance plans) or non-medical financial consequences of 
treatment (transportation costs in Canada are rarely covered by insurers) are entirely paid out of 
pocket by the patient at the time of use. Assuming that any item not on the list of most insurers 
is not strictly necessary from a medical perspective (it can be beneficial but the marginal cost 
exceeds the marginal capacity to benefit the patient from an insurers’ perspective) we bundle 
these non covered costs in the “non medical uncertainty” bundle.  Thus the non-medical 
uncertainty is left unaddressed by this type of insurance product. 
4
                                                 
2 Other factors of increase in the cost of coverage include self-selection and asymmetries of information as 
illustrated by Cutler and Zeckhauser, (2000). 
. Another incurred cost is for treatments 
needed and associated with improved quality of life by the patient even in the absence of any 
proven clinical benefit, and typically not covered by general healthcare insurance policies. Last, 
one cost of illness  not coverable by standard  healthcare insurance  is the loss of utility 
associated with having an illness (and not fully recovering to the prior health state). 
3 The assumption here is that many health events are catastrophic and that multiple events related to an illness are 
not uncommon. 
4 We note that to some degree this can be addressed through the separate purchase of disability insurance, but it may 
not fully compensate for all lost income. THE VALUE OF FIXED-REIMBURSEMENT HEALTHCARE INSURANCE – EVIDENCE FROM CANCER PATIENTS IN ONARIO, CANADA 
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All these types of costs of illness (out-of-pocket costs of treatment and transportations, 
forgone income, utility loss) cannot be covered by standard price pay-off policies typically used 
in  general  healthcare insurance  policies. However they  can be covered through fixed-
reimbursement insurance;  the insured purchases  the right to an income transfer, known in 
advance, in case of a given illness (therefore conditioned on the realization of the illness)
5
We have recently observed that Canadian statistics on fixed-reimbursement healthcare 
insurance, commonly referred to as critical illness insurance (CII), have shown strong growth in 
the marketplace between 2001 and 2005. The  average annual growth was  22%
. The 
insured is then free to use the income as they see fit, to buy new technologies or treatments not 
covered by public or private insurance plans, compensate for lost earnings, to pay for 
transportation costs linked to the treatment, buy extra tests or diagnostics, or simply 
compensate their loss of utility incurred as a consequence of their illness.   Hence under a 
variety of circumstances one can imagine that these fixed-reimbursement policies can be of 
value to the insured. 
6 over this 
period and individual policies are now approaching 400,000, with similar numbers of individuals 
belonging to group plans, hence totaling approximately 800,000  insured individuals
7.  These 
numbers are significant when you consider that the Canadian population is approximately one 
tenth that of the United States, and hence it would represent the equivalent of approximately 8 
million policies in the United States. Although these figures represents only 5% of the 16 million 
in the Canadian labor force
8
This raises the question, what behavioral, economic, or marketplace variables are 
influencing Canadians’ demand for CII?  Additionally, what can this tell us regarding the demand 
for utility loss compensation when sick? We ask this in the context of those who choose to 
, we expect that when considering those who are financially able to 
afford the policies, are not covered by any mechanism compensating forgone incomes such as 
employer-sponsored disability insurance, and would not be excluded for medical reasons, this 
likely represents closer to 20% of the  attainable market in the  working population.  This is 
remarkable considering the effects of adverse selection and cream skimming, the role of which 
will be discussed later in this paper.  This growth is of interest when you consider that many 
insurance demand theorists consider fixed-reimbursement  healthcare insurance to be highly 
unattractive under most circumstances (Cutler & Zeckhauser, 2000).   
                                                 
5 Indemnity payment generally is conditioned on a 30 day survival post diagnosis. 
6  Munich Re’s Critical Illness Survey 2006, Munich Re Canada 
7 Data provided by Munich Re  Canada, Oct 2008 
8 Statistics Canada, 2006 Census CHRISTOPHER J LONGO 
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purchase CII policies, since we are unable to assess those who do not choose to purchase 
policies.  Although this represents a limited segment of the Canadian population, we believe 
understanding the demand characteristics of those who do purchase is important.   
Understanding the variables that influence demand for these products will  improve our 
understanding of the motives behind the demand for healthcare insurance (a highly disputed 
issue, see Nyman, 2003, and Blomqvist, 2001). This will in turn shed light on the debate of the 
normative consequences related to moral hazard in healthcare insurance, an issue that has 
considerable bearing on options regarding implementing universal and public insurance.  
In this paper we study the determinants of the demand for CII in the Canadian setting.  
We use a variety of data sources to evaluate our models. Additionally, we use aggregate data 
on CII policy face amounts
9 across age and gender categories
10
 
. We use a unique dataset 
describing out-of-pocket costs of cancer patients collected in Ontario to measure the expected 
gain of a CII coverage in terms of the loss uncertainty described earlier. We then complement 
these  datasets  with aggregate level information on forgone income and run simulations to 
capture the other expected benefits (compensation for utility loss of being sick and the 
uncertainty of recovery) of receiving an income transfer when sick. We aim to deduct a value of 
the state-dependent utility loss of being sick from the guaranteed income transfer in CII just as 
Zeckhauser has done (in 1973) for the value of life deducted from willingness to pay for 
catastrophic illness insurance policies. Our idea here is straightforward: we want to use the 
opportunity provided by the data we have at hand to estimate the value of covering the financial 
risk involved in critical illness, and then to use any excess between that value and the policy 
face value individuals actually purchase as an indicator of the value attached to being 
compensated for the utility loss of being sick. This is a rare opportunity to contribute empirical 
evidence to the so far purely theoretical literature on state dependent utility and insurance. We 
recognize that observed excesses (if seen) may be explained through a variety of causal 
pathways other than state dependent utility transfer (e.g. wealth management, access to care) 
and we consider these other pathways in turn later in the paper.   
We start  our investigation by applying an existing model for fixed-reimbursement 
insurance presented by Eeckhoudt et al. (2003) to CII.  We then consider modifications to this 
model, and finally we test both models’ ability to predict Canadian purchase patterns based on 
                                                 
9  Policy face amounts indicate the value of the maximum payment should an insured qualify for a policy claim 
10 Data on file, Munich Re Canada, Oct 2008 THE VALUE OF FIXED-REIMBURSEMENT HEALTHCARE INSURANCE – EVIDENCE FROM CANCER PATIENTS IN ONARIO, CANADA 
CHEPA WORKINGPAPER 09-03  9 
actual expenditure and insurance purchasing data.  We posit that the existing fixed-
reimbursement model may not fully explain purchasing patterns, and that modified models that 
incorporate other behavioral, economic or market variables may better predict insurance 
purchasing patterns. This investigation is expected to add to the debate in the literature (see 
Cutler et al.[2008]) on whether demand for healthcare insurance is purely motivated by risk-
aversion and wealth management, or whether other behavioral, economic or market variables 
are important components of demand in these markets. 
This article proceeds as follows. In “fixed-reimbursement healthcare insurance model” 
we discuss the value of these policy offerings, from both an insurer and insured perspective, 
and outline a basic fixed-reimbursement model as proposed by Eeckhoudt et al. (2003), with a 
focus on its application for healthcare insurance.  We then evaluate other behavioral, economic 
and marketplace pathways (or variables) that may impact the purchase of fixed-reimbursement 
healthcare insurance and then outline a modified model that assumes part of the purchase 
decision is influenced by these identified variables.  Each of the pathways will be discussed 
outlining  the  justification and feasibility of including them in the model.   In “Methods and 
Canadian Data Sources” we provide details and simulation strategies for the data we have on 
hand about cancer patients’ costs. Additionally we provide detail and simulation strategies on 
insurance data describing the purchase patterns for critical illness insurance, cancer incidence 
data  in Canada by age category,  and net wealth data for Canadians.  We outline the 
methodology employed to combine this disparate data, which should provide an indication of 
each variables’ influence. We focus on cancer as Canadian insurance data shows that 70% of 
CII claims are for cancer
11
 
.  In “Results from Application of models” we use this aforementioned 
data and apply it to both the Eeckhoudt model and the Eeckhoudt plus additional variable(s) 
model and report on their ability to predict purchase patterns for CII, with some interpretation of 
these results. “Conclusions” contains a summary of our findings, and the implications for the 
theory of demand for healthcare insurance. Some future research opportunities  are also 
discussed in brief. 
Fixed-reimbursement healthcare insurance model 
It is often said that, because of the characteristics of healthcare insurance, there is no 
role for a fixed-reimbursement offering, where a lump-sum payment is transferred to the 
                                                 
11 Source Canada Life Critical Illness Policies 2007,  accessed Oct 2008 CHRISTOPHER J LONGO 
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10 
insured, conditional on a diagnosis provided by a doctor, acting in that respect as the insurer’s 
agent  (Cutler & Zeckhauser, 2000).   This theory  seems  appropriate when discussing usual 
medical practice delivered through the doctor as agent of the insurer.  However, as the insurer 
cannot verify the magnitude of the non-medical expenditures associated with an illness (non-
medical uncertainty)  or of medical expenditures not deemed absolutely necessary from a 
medical perspective, but perceived as better quality care by the insured/patient, the fixed-
reimbursement strategy can become a more desirable solution for the insurer (Gollier, 1996). 
Additionally, in the Canadian setting limitations associated with the Canada Health Act prohibit 




. However  providing lump sum payments to be used to support  unfunded or 
underfunded  health care  related costs  would not violate this Act, provided they seek care 
outside of the hospital setting. Hence, in Canada there is motivation for the supply of fixed-
reimbursement schemes in health, called CII or what Eeckhoudt et al. (2003) refers to as dread 
disease insurance.  The Canadian market appears to be one example where the conditions may 
be  optimal  for this type of healthcare insurance  policy, as it facilitates extending the 
comprehensiveness of health care coverage without violating the Canada Health Act itself.  
Insurer perspective 
The fixed-reimbursement model is attractive for the insurer as underwriting and actuarial 
calculations for health are relatively straightforward provided some reliable data exist on the 
incidence of the illness by age, gender, and a few other relevant observable characteristics like 
smoking status, other comorbidities, and family history of disease.  These types of statistics will 
allow the insurer to estimate the likelihood of a payout, and determine an appropriate premium 
after adjusting for other expected factors like adverse selection and policy lapses. In fact we 
know that the National Cancer Institute of Canada provides annual statistics on cancer 
incidence by age and gender, which allows insurers to calculate their estimated risk of a payout 
for cancer patients.  This calculation assumes all persons who wish to purchase a CII policy are 
accepted. However insurance data suggests that in fact only 71% of these applications are 
accepted. It is also noteworthy that those policies that are conditionally accepted with a health 
rating
13  list  the primary reason  being medical (74%), or family history (23%).
14
                                                 
12  We note that in Canada 70% of health care is funded through the public purse (OECD, 2007) 
  Previous 
13  Health rating is based on factors such as comorbidities, smoking status, and family history. 
14  Munich Re’s Critical Illness Survey 2006, Munich Re Canada THE VALUE OF FIXED-REIMBURSEMENT HEALTHCARE INSURANCE – EVIDENCE FROM CANCER PATIENTS IN ONARIO, CANADA 
CHEPA WORKINGPAPER 09-03  11 
literature on cancer suggests higher cancer risks associated with a family history of cancer in 
8% of stomach cancers and 3% of colorectal cancers (Steinburg,1990), 4.6% of  prostate, 9.6% 
of ovarian/breast cancers (Cerhan, 1999) and 6.0% of lung cancers (Samet, 1986).  Hence the 
true risk to insurers of facing a payout is reduced when those at highest risk are screened out, 
or offered a policy with exclusions.  
Insurers must also factor in the effect of lapsed policies, as no payout is made in the 
majority of these cases. Lapsed policies occur when an individual discontinues their insurance 
before making a claim. Although the frequency of lapsed policies across age and gender is not 
publicly available, industry survey data suggests that lapsed polices range between 1.3% and 
8.3% depending on the age, smoking status, and type of policy purchased
15
Finally insurers can partially adjust for policy holders misrepresentation when adjudicating 
claims and determine whether indemnity claims are invalid
. Insurers generally 
set their policy premiums based on an expected lapse rate, and hence the effect on their 
profitability depends on whether they overestimate (lower profits) or underestimate (higher 
profits) lapse rates.  
16.  This can often be accommodated 
through medical records that may demonstrate that applicants were aware of conditions that 
would have excluded them from eligibility for policies.  Data suggests that between 24% and 
29% of claims are rejected and includes rejections based on conditions not being covered, 





We have focused exclusively on theories that incorporate the utility derived from a fixed-
reimbursement contract for healthcare from the perspective of a prospective policy holder. We 
develop our reasoning on the assumption that demand for CII follows the tenets of expected 
utility theory. In our discussion section though, we qualify our findings based on an alternate 
theoretical model namely prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The model that best 
describes the basic properties of fixed reimbursement insurance under expected utility has been 
presented by Eeckhoudt et al. (2003).   The authors describe a fixed reimbursement contract C 
                                                 
15  Munich Re’s Critical Illness Survey 2006, Munich Re Canada 
16  Occurs typically when an insured makes a claim, but it is later discovered that full disclosure of relevant disease 
information was not provided to the insurer 
17  Munich Re’s Critical illness Survey 2006, Munich Re Canada CHRISTOPHER J LONGO 
CHEPA WORKINGPAPER 09-03 
 
12 
as a pair (R,Z) where R is the lump sum reimbursement, and Z is the premium.   Following their 
notation the premium is the product of probability of the event (e.g. cancer diagnosis) and the 
indemnity plus a loading factor (.  
    Z= p(1 + )R,          (1) 
They then describe the expected utility derived from purchasing such a contract (V) for 
an insured with initial wealth W0 as, 
  V = (1-p)U(W0 – Z) + pEU(W0 – Z – L
~
+R),    (2) 
Where L
~
 is the random loss (out-of-pocket cost of cancer treatment and/or forgone 
income) and U is the utility of wealth, and EU is the expected utility with respect to L
~
. 
They propose that the optimal fixed reimbursement is the sum of the expected loss plus 
the precautionary equivalent premium as defined by Kimball (1990).  Kimball’s model predicts 
that the optimal reimbursement R*, when there is a positive loading factor, is strictly lower than 
the largest possible loss  L
~
.  Their model  proves  that the income elasticity of this type of 
insurance is dependant on whether absolute prudence
18
We propose to build on the  Eeckhoudt  model  by  evaluating  a variety of additional 
variables including the role of state-dependent utility transfers. As an illustration one possible 
model modification includes a state-dependent utility variable: utility is a function of wealth but 
 is decreasing. A more general model 
allowing individuals to buy R* greater than the maximum observed loss should incorporate other 
variables such as state-dependant utility. Eeckhoudt et al. however do not factor in the state-
dependant utility component in his model.  In fact in their 2003 publication Eeckhoudt et al. state 
“... many fixed-reimbursement insurance policies arise in setting what are naturally cast within a 
state-dependent utility framework...extending the present article in that direction is also a 
potential area for future study”.  We agree with this statement, and endeavor to investigate the 
incorporation  of state-dependent utility  as well as other  potential variables  into the existing 
formula to determine if any of these variables improve the ability to predict actual demand and 
purchasing characteristics  for fixed-reimbursement  healthcare insurance  in the Canadian 
setting.  
                                                 
18  Prudence is defined by Kimball (1990) as “the propensity to prepare and forearm oneself in the face of 
uncertainty, in contrast to “risk aversion”, which is how much one dislikes uncertainty and would turn away from 
uncertainty if possible” THE VALUE OF FIXED-REIMBURSEMENT HEALTHCARE INSURANCE – EVIDENCE FROM CANCER PATIENTS IN ONARIO, CANADA 
CHEPA WORKINGPAPER 09-03  13 
when an individual is diagnosed with cancer their functional relationship between wealth and 
utility  changes (Cook and Graham, 1977). As a result, they use a portion of the lump-sum 
payment R to compensate for that change in their level of utility due to health shocks: 
V = (1-p)UH2(W0 – Z) + pEUH1(W0 – Z – L
~
+R),   
(H2 equals healthy state; H1 equals the sick state)    (3) 
Since the utility functions are not known (it is not even clear whether the marginal utility 
in the sick state is greater or smaller than in the healthy state at the same level of utility) we do 
not derive the optimal levels of compensation for the financial loss (motivated by prudence) and 
compensation for the utility loss. Suffice here to mention that, following Kimball (1990), if an 
individual purchases a fixed reimbursement greater than the  largest possible loss, the one 
possible motivation for it is a monetary compensation for the effect of the health on utility. As a 
result,  in this example we use any difference between an approximation of the reasonable 
maximum perceived financial loss and the fixed reimbursement purchased through policies in 
Canada as a lower bound for the monetary equivalent of a cancer diagnosis that insured want to 
be compensated for: they buy a policy for prudence motives linked to the cost of repairing their 
health (which includes income replacement if they need to quit their job temporarily because of 
their illness) but also to get an income transfer as a pure compensation for their loss of utility as 
a consequence of developing an illness covered under the policy.   
In fact we have reason to believe that variables like state-dependant utility could be 
important in fixed-reimbursement healthcare insurance in the Canadian setting. The Canadian 
expenditure data that we have from previous research suggests that most cancer patients will 
have expected observable costs of less than $25,000
19
                                                 
19 8.2% spent more than $25,000 on medical costs, travel and forgone wages, 4.8% spent more than $50,000, and  
only 2% spent  more than $100,000; data on file 
, so that most purchases above this point 
could be an indication of an influence from some other variable in addition to loss recovery.  
Data from the reinsurer Munich Re suggests that for the Canadian insured between the age of 
20 and 50 the average face amount of a CII policy is approximately $80,000 suggesting that 
more than half of the policy face value may be attributed to other variables, as yet undefined 
including variables like state dependent utility (Table 1).  We note that the average face amount 
for 60 plus year olds is closer to $63,000 which may reflect face amount limitations based on the 
larger premiums for this age category, a decline in the loss of utility due to critical illnesses when 
they occur later in life, or some other behavioral, economic, or market variable. CHRISTOPHER J LONGO 




Plausible explanatory pathways 
We will investigate the respective strengths of other pathways, beyond state-dependent 
utility, by using data on the purchase of CII in Canada
20
The basic model of fixed-reimbursement insurance (Eeckhoudt et al. 2003) represents it 
as closely mimicking the role of precautionary savings in inter-temporal saving models.  Hence 
one plausible explanation is that the utility function can be reduced to a wealth management 
function.  Trends related to policy face values in relation to costs and potential lost income will 
allow us to determine whether the precautionary savings or “prudence” explanation is 
supported.   If the prudence model is supported we would expect to see increases in policy face 
values as income and expenses increase, and that the value of policies be on average roughly 
equal to the sum of these two financial risks.  
. We feel it is appropriate to investigate 
the ability of these other pathways  to reliably predict  the demand  dynamics  for fixed 
reimbursement healthcare insurance and provide explanations for their inclusion or exclusion 
from our modified Eeckhoudt  et al.  model.   These additional pathways include prudence 
(wealth management) and motives of access to costly treatments. These pathways could 
influence either the degree of perceived risk (and risk aversion) or the attractiveness of the 
purchase.    
We note that the cost of treatment for cancer can be substantial when factoring in out-of-
pocket costs for medical and non-medical services related to cancer treatment, lost income, and 
travel costs (Longo, 2006, 2007).  Hence, it is plausible that at lower levels of wealth insurance 
is a way of accessing care when net wealth is below the expected cost of treatment (Nyman 
1999, 2006). Insufficient net wealth or net income might therefore be a strong motivation for 
buying these policies. When looking at the data we would expect that as the variability of patient 
expenses increases that those purchasing CII  based on an access motive would be inclined to 
purchase a policy with a larger face amount (larger payout). We also assume that individuals 
behave rationally when making these purchases. Trends in the data are expected to either 
support (increase in face value correlates with increased variability in expenditures) or refute (no 
relationship between face value and variability) the access motive.    
 
                                                 
20 Data provided by Munich Re Canada, October 2008 THE VALUE OF FIXED-REIMBURSEMENT HEALTHCARE INSURANCE – EVIDENCE FROM CANCER PATIENTS IN ONARIO, CANADA 
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Confounding factors 
Although not specifically explaining demand behavior of the insured, other factors may 
affect the likelihood that individuals  purchase policies.  These factors impact the insurer’s 
offerings both in terms of adjustments in loading fees, premiums, and exclusions. As a result of 
these factors individuals may purchase less than optimal face amounts. The impact of these 
factors, if significant, would likely result in a conservative estimate of the value of state 
dependent utility.  
The true actuarial cost of CII for the insured is the loading fee, the percentage of the 
lump sum reimbursement charged on top of the actuarially fair premium (see equation 1). We 
have access to aggregate data from the Canadian insurance industry combined with aggregate 
data on the incidence of cancer by age that allow us to calculate crude loading ratios for these 
contracts. We also have data from the Munich Re Critical Illness Survey 2006 that provides 
some indication of overall loading fees, although not age specific.  These data will allow us to 
determine whether variation in loading fees is suggestive of either adverse selection or cream 
skimming. 
The extent of adverse selection in healthcare insurance  is empirically disputed and 
seems to be strongly context-related.  In fact there is some evidence that suggests that this type 
of insurance does exhibit  adverse selection. Data from the “Critical Illness Survey 2006” 
suggests that up to 65% of claims are made within the first three years following policy issue
21
Cream skimming is a way for insurers to reduce their risk of an indemnity payout. Data 
suggests that those who have pre-existing medical conditions or a family history of covered 
medical conditions are likely to be refused policies, providing evidence suggesting that to some 
degree cream skimming is undertaken by insurers.  We use Canadian cancer incidence data 
and premium schedules to determine the crude loading ratios and test this against industry 
. 
This despite the fact that potential policyholders must be screened before acceptance and the 
insurer attempts to identify those at high risk for filing a claim.  Additionally in the event an 
insured had some prior knowledge of a risk factor and chose not to disclose it there is an 
increased likelihood that the indemnity will not be paid by virtue of misrepresentation of risk 
information.  Hence because of these factors we expect that adverse selection should be 
mitigated, but test for this by measuring loading ratios based on premiums and cancer statistics 
against industry standards for loading ratios (typically about 1.25: 1 for these products). 
                                                 
21  Source,  Munich Re Canada CHRISTOPHER J LONGO 
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standards to evaluate whether cream skimming is present across age and gender categories 
and report on this in our results.  
 
Methods and Canadian data sources 
Using data from a variety of sources we attempt to simulate the expected losses across 7 age 
categories from 30-65 years of age.  We compare this data to the aggregate data on the face 
amount of policies purchased. Data for those younger than 30 years of age is not included 
because very few policies are purchased, and very few cases of the common cancers occur at 
these younger ages. In our base case we report on male non smokers (82% of male policy 
holders), and on families with two incomes (34% of sample)
22
 
. We assume that policy holders 
attempt to replace 67% of family income (or the income of the primary income earner), but run 
sensitivity analyses assuming 50% and 100% of family income. We validate these results by 
looking at non-smoking females (86% of female policy holders) in two income families.   In order 






th percentiles of the data for cancer costs, income, and policy face amounts. We also 
run scenarios using 90
th percentile for cancer costs, and average values for income and face 
amount  to simulate highly risk averse  individuals.  We present the results for non-smoking 
males, and describe differences (if any) to those of non-smoking females and those other than 
two income families.  In each case we determine the expected face amount of policies and then 
identify “differences” or discrepancies (if any) and evaluate the possible role of other variables in 
explaining these differences. 
We note that although we have individual level data for cancer expenditures, net income, and 
net wealth we are unable to link these records.  We also note that in terms of data on CII 
policies purchased by age and gender, and the face values of these policies by age and gender 
these are aggregate data, and hence conclusions are only suggestive rather than predictive.  
Hence the use of data from the insurance industry on the retention rates by age, gender, and 
risk categories (smokers/non-smokers), combined with data on wealth by age from Statistics 
                                                 
22  We do this to increase the homogeneity of the sample, but test this in a sensitivity analysis by examining all 
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Canada although providing estimates of the influences of prudence and compensation for health 
shocks, we are unable to provide clear cause and effect relationships.  
More specifically we use the following data sources. We first include data from previous 
work by Longo et al (2006, 2007) that provides cancer patient costing at the individual level for a 
sample of patients from Ontario, Canada including costs of:  medical treatments,  non-medical 
treatments related to cancer treatment,  travel costs, and foregone income for both patients and 
their caregivers.  This data is a sample of 282 subjects with cancer, although samples in our 
analysis may be smaller as a consequence of missing data fields for some subjects. This data 
allows us to report on averages as well as variances, and we  assume the sample is 
representative of Canadian patients. As an informal validation we note that the data in Longo et 
al are similar across multiple dimensions to data published by Lauzier  (2008) in Quebec, 
Canada.  We run analyses that exclude lost income, based on the fact that there is some 
evidence to suggest that the insured consider income replacement as part of their motivation to 
purchase CII so including income replacement and actual lost income may result in a double 
counting of income risk. In Longo’s study it was noted that the average duration of treatment 
was approximately 11 months, hence the assumption was that individuals would require 
compensation for up to a year of lost work.  Data by Lauzier (2008) in Quebec, Canada found 
that the average time away from work was approximately 6 months, with 21% of the sample still 
away from work at one year.  Hence our data and that of Lauzier would suggest that the loss of 
one  year’s  employment is a reasonable worst case scenario  representing the 20% of the 
population most affected by their illness, despite an average of less than a year in both Lauzier 
(2008) and Longo (2007).  We have assumed this worst case scenario in all of our simulations.  
It may also be worth noting that in many cases this lost time from work may not be a behavioral 
influence (one chooses to leave work), but rather a functional one (one is not able or their 
employer is not willing to allow them to continue employment). We also use data on incidence of 
cancer by gender and across age categories obtained from the “Canadian Cancer Statistics, 
2008” published annually by the National Cancer Institute of Canada  as a method of 
determining crude loading ratios, and report on these values for determination of adverse 
selection and cream skimming effects.      
We include data on annual costs of policies, derived from Canada Life 10 year term 
policies and based on non-smokers in average health, with face amounts of $25,000 (common 
expenditure for cancer patients including lost income) through $100,000 face amount (typical 
value of purchased policies  in the most recent full year recorded) across age and gender CHRISTOPHER J LONGO 
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categories (as of Oct 2008). We also obtained premiums based on average values within age 
and gender categories for non-smokers (Table 1).  The use of non-smokers is based on industry 
sources data that shows 82% of male policy holders are non-smokers, and 86% of female policy 
holders are non-smokers
23
Additionally we use data from the “2005 Canadian Survey of Financial Security” from 
Statistics Canada, which outlines net wealth based on surveys of 9,000 family dwelling in 
Canada. This survey provides income and wealth data by age and gender among other 
variables.  We classify data across age and gender categories for the primary wage earner in 
the household.  We note that we are unable to link the net wealth and income data to cancer 
expenditures and hence the results will be suggestive only.  These  results should assist in 
determining which theories remain plausible under a variety of assumptions. 
 . 
Lastly we incorporate data on individual critical illness policies purchased between 1996 
and 2008 as provided by Munich Re, representing approximately 80-85% of purchased policies 
in Canada (personal communication, Helene Michaud, Munich Re, Oct 2008).  We focus on the 
periods 2002-2007 as these data represent similar time periods to the cancer expenditure data 
(2002-2003) and the net wealth survey (2005).  As data was presented in three year blocks we 
include data from 2006 -2007 for policy face values, which may introduce some error in 
estimating the true policy face amount.  
 
We have made some key assumptions in our fixed-reimbursement healthcare insurance 
model.  First, we have assumed that individuals are risk averse.  A significant body of literature 
supports this premise (Arrow, 1965; Pratt, 1964;  Friedman, 1974; Szpiro, 1986), although there 
is some variability in the degree of risk aversion, and some discussion of whether this is just an 
artifact of diminishing marginal utility of income (Nyman, 2006). 
Model assumptions  
Second, we assume that critical illness insurance payout requirements demand that the 
diagnosis  is appropriately documented and  policyholders survive 30 days post-diagnosis.  
Although these factors will result in a decrease in claims, data on the percentage of individuals 
that do not meet these conditions is not publicly available across age categories, so for this 
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reason we have not included this factor in our model.  We believe that this factor would increase 
the loading ratio in favour of the insurer. 
Third, we assume that individuals transition from a state of perfect health to critical 
illness with no intermediate states.  They therefore can afford premiums (in the healthy state), or 
are drawing on insurance or net worth if they become ill (based on their decision to be fully 
insured or not). 
Fourth, we assume expenditures for cancer treatment in Ontario would be representative of 
expenditures in other regions of Canada, and we also assume that the costs of other illnesses 
(i.e. heart attacks) would have similar out-of-pocket expenditures to that of cancer. Although 
levels of coverage vary between provinces it is not expected that these differences would be 
significantly different across most health services. 
Fifth, we are only investigating individual CII policies and not group policies. This 
distinction is important as individual policies are purchased based on a persons personal or 
family situation, whereas group policies are by and large purchased by employers without input 
from the individuals who would benefit. The motivations for each of these policy purchases are 
quite different, and we are not attempting to assess corporate demand or motivations in this 
manuscript.  
Finally, it is assumed for simplicity that this examination is based on an individual risk 
rather than the collective risk of all family members.  Otherwise we should employ an algorithm 
that factors in the net cost should multiple family members become ill, and would require 
multiple premiums.  Although this can be calculated based on both incidence and health record 
data this paper has chosen not to address this more complex scenario. However in the income 
section we do make assumptions regarding the role of each family member as an income 
earner, and run sensitivity analysis using a variety of income sharing assumptions. 
 
Results from Application of Models 
We find that when policies are purchased according to expected losses the predictive 
value  of the model  is reasonably good  (based on average values in our  base case), but 
consistently suggests policy face amounts lower than the average policy purchased, and these 
differences are especially pronounced in those in the 30-35 and 35-40 age categories (Figure CHRISTOPHER J LONGO 
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1). We note that insufficient data below age 30 is available; hence the 30-35 age category 
represents the youngest category examined.  
 
Sensitivity analyses 
Sensitivity analysis using replacement of 100% of family income, and 50% of family 
income all show similar discrepancies in face amounts purchased, with the 50% assumption 
providing the largest differential (data not shown). If we use cancer expenditures, income and 
face amounts based on the 90
th percentile (a theoretical worst case scenario) we find that policy 
values cover expenditures and lost income with excess coverage remaining in only the lowest 




th percentile for 
cancer costs, income and face amount suggest that excess coverage occurs at 30-35, 35-40, 
40-45, and 45-50 [Figure 2].  Additionally we found that  when using the 90
th  percentile for 
cancer costs, but average values for income and policy face amounts that excess coverage 
occurred in 30-35, 35-40 and 40-45 age categories (data not shown).  In the most extreme risk 
averse  case where individuals expect 90
th  percentile for cancer  cost, and purchase 90
th 
percentile for policy face amount, we see excess coverage in all age categories (data not 
shown). Results using all family income data (not just 2 income families) show similar outcomes 
to those in the average scenario (data not shown). 
   The results assuming replacement of 100% of family income for non-smoking males 
(instead of 67% in our base case) suggest that all cases except the 90
th percentile show that the 
face amount exceeds income and cancer expenditure data in the age categories of 30-35, 35-
40, and 40-45.  Analysis using 50% of family income shows excess coverage in all analyses for 
ages 30-35, 35-40, and 40-45 (results not shown). 
Results from the non-smoking female analysis provide similar results to those of the 
males with the only difference being that all analyses resulted in excess coverage for ages 30-
35, 35-40, and 40-45, and in all but the 90
th and 80
th percentiles 45-50 age category as well.   
These base case results and the results from sensitivity analyses are not supportive of 
the influence of prudence alone which would predict that face amounts that exceed lost income 
and expected financial expenditure would not be expected to occur.  This conclusion appears 
robust as we see evidence of excess coverage in almost all simulations of  the models for 30-45 
year olds. THE VALUE OF FIXED-REIMBURSEMENT HEALTHCARE INSURANCE – EVIDENCE FROM CANCER PATIENTS IN ONARIO, CANADA 
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Plausible explanatory pathways 
As the data does suggest that other factors are influencing the purchase amount in the 
policy, we investigate other plausible explanations. One possible explanation addressed earlier 
was the access motive (Nyman, 2006).  However we would expect, assuming rational behavior 
of the insured, that as the variability increases the size of the policy would also increase yet 
although variability of cancer expenditure mostly increases with age (Table 1), we do not see a 
resulting increase in the size of the policies face amount, hence we reject the notion that the 
access motive is instrumental in determining the face amount of the policy.  
The other possible explanation is related to affordability
24.  We have assumed that policy 
premiums in excess of 4.5% of family income would be considered unattractive or unaffordable.  
We use this figure as many publicly funded health care systems use between 2.5% and 4.5% of 
family income as an affordability threshold criterion in setting co-payments for health services
25.  
We note that in all but the 60 and over age category for males the current premiums for non-
smokers (representing 82% of policy holders) vary between 0.6% (30 yrs) and 1.67% (50 yrs) of 
family income. Similar results are seen in the female population with ranges from 0.7% (30 yrs) 
to 1.58% (50 yrs), but with values for the 60 and over category being just outside the 4.5% 
threshold (4.81%) if policies similar to younger age categories are applied. We do note that 
premiums increase dramatically for those above 60 and that policy values equal to those of 
younger cohorts would exceed 5% of family income, but the face amount typically purchased 
($61,000 males, $47,000 females) results in a premium that is 3.4% (male policies) and 3.8% 
(female policies) of family income, which is within most publicly set affordability thresholds
26
                                                 
24 There is no unanimous definition of “affordability” of insurance. A recent contribution by Bundorf and Pauly 
(2006) suggests that all households with an income at least the sum of the premium and a socially defined minimum 
level of consumption on all goods other than insurance should be deemed able to afford the insurance. In most 
applied social policy contributions it is assumed that when the cost of insurance goes beyond a given percentage of 
income (typically 4.5%) the household cannot afford it.  
.  
Hence affordability is an additional plausible influencing factor for purchasing behaviors in those 
over the age of 60, but not for those under this age, and might also account for the lack of 
excess coverage in these age categories. 
25  Means testing for pharmaceutical co-payments in Ontario and Manitoba, Canada are examples. 
26  We used average ages within the age category (62.5 years in the 60-65 age range) and note that this would 
slightly underestimate premiums for a 65 year old ($3,018) and overestimate premiums of a 60 year old ($1940) 
compared to the average ($2601); all examples male, non smoker.  CHRISTOPHER J LONGO 
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Another possible explanation for the policy purchasing behavior relates to the insured 
net wealth.  Data from Statistics Canada suggests that net wealth (and our own calculation of 
net liquid wealth that excludes real estate equity) suggest that those in the younger age groups 
would be most likely to purchase policies beyond income and cancer expenses, as is the case 
in our results.  However the other possible explanation is that the younger insured use the 
excess value above income replacement and expected disease expenditures as a state 
dependent  utility compensation, and as net wealth grows this utility compensation is 
accommodated through net wealth rather than the purchase of an excess face value on CII.  
Data on net wealth across age categories is reported in Table 1. 
Finally we could consider that the insured purchase amounts in excess of their needs 
due to uncertainty, and out of fear of bankruptcy as a consequence of their illness.   This 
however does not explain the fact that the older cohorts appear to have a diminished 
uncertainty or fear of bankruptcy, since they typically purchase little or no excess coverage.  In 
light of this we consider this explanation at best incomplete. 
  
Confounding factors 
We note that in our crude calculations of loading ratios that it appears for younger age 
categories that loading ratios of less than 0.50 occur frequently (pay out less than 50 cents on 
the dollar), yet for some of the older age categories the loading ratio is above 0.80.  Industry 
survey results suggest that the true loading ratios are likely between 0.70 and 0.80, suggesting 
that adverse selection is influencing the loading ratios for the younger insured, and that cream 
skimming is occurring for the older insured
27
Interpretation of results 
. This data is suggestive only, as insufficient data is 
available on rejected policies, denied claims, and indemnities paid across age  and gender 
categories. 
We note that these results provide support for a modification of the existing Eeckhoudt 
model.  The fact that in most simulations there existed policy face amounts well in excess of 
expected cancer expenditure and income loss, in many age categories, supports the notion that 
other variables are influencing the insured decision on the face value of policy purchased.  This 
                                                 
27  We note that data from the Munich Re Critical Illness Survey 2006 states that 65% of claims are submitted within 
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clearly suggests these policies are  often  not being purchased as a wealth management 
strategy, or at  least not exclusively as a wealth management strategy.  We considered 
explanations related to access and recognized that as variability in cancer expenditure mostly 
increases with age this should result in an increase in face amount with age (Table 1), yet this 
was not observed, and hence on this basis we have rejected the access motive as proposed by 
Nyman.    A consideration of state-dependent utility compensation seems plausible as an 
explanation yet appears to diminish and in many simulations disappears by age 40 or 45.   
Although this is not fully supportive of the state-dependent utility compensation we observe that 
net wealth (less real estate equity) grows significantly in these later years and could be an 
alternate source of state dependent utility compensation.  In this regard and in support of this 
notion is the fact that as premiums rise CII purchasers tend to purchase amounts consistent 
with just covering cancer expenditures and income losses only which allows them to stay below 
the typical threshold for affordability of 4.5% of family income. 
One other aspect of the data requires some comment, namely the distribution of policies 
purchased by age and policy face amount.   We note that overall the mean values are typically 
around $80,000 in the years we investigated (2002-2007).  However overall data suggests that 
approximately 17% purchase policies in excess of $100,000, and that the distribution seems to 
be bimodal with the largest percentage of policies  having face amounts between $25,000 - 
$50,000 (27.5% of issued policies) and $75,000 - $100,000 (37.8% of issued policies)
28
 
. It is not 
clear why this bimodal distribution has occurred.  One possible explanation is that two distinct 
groups of consumers exist.  First, those who are working without other healthcare insurance 
policies that protect them when unable to work (similar to disability insurance) so purchase 
policies to compensate them when sick ($25,000-$50,000 policies), and the other being self-
employed individuals who choose to cover their loss from business revenues when unable to 
work due to illness ($75,000-$100,000 policies).   
Conclusions 
We investigated the existing Eeckhoudt model and a modified Eeckhoudt model to 
determine whether either reliably predicts trends in CII purchase in the Canadian setting.  Our 
results suggest that the existing Eeckhoudt model seems to underestimate the size of the 
policies purchased and this effect is especially pronounced in those in the 30-35 year and 35-40 
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year categories and is consistent in almost all sensitivity analyses. These results suggest that 
other factors are likely influencing purchasing behaviors of the insured, especially in the younger 
cohorts.  The trends in our empirical analysis did not support either an explanation based 
exclusively on prudence (or wealth management), nor did it support the notion of an access 
motive. Our modified Eeckhoudt model therefore suggest that the incorporation of state-utility 
transfers and/or affordability variables as both of these are supported by the empirical data.  
Incorporating these variables allows  a  better prediction of  purchasing behaviors, but  it  still 
provides an imperfect prediction based on the available Canadian data sources used (Figure 2).  
It is not clear exactly what amount of state-utility compensation the insured is seeking, but the 
amounts purchased were as high as CDN$45,000, suggesting it represents as much as 50% of 
the face amount in younger cohorts.  In fact it is possible that at older age categories it is the 
affordability issue that is masking the state-utility transfer to some degree, as we see examples 
of policy amounts staying below the typical affordability threshold of 4.5%.  We note however 
that net wealth may also play a role in minimizing the degree of state-dependant utility since 
accumulated savings could be used instead of the CII  indemnity for those in older age 
categories.  
We would be remiss if we did not consider prospect theory as a plausible explanation 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Prospect theory suggests that individuals tend to over-react to 
losses generated by rare events, such as the incidence of cancer in a given year for a given 
individual or the incidence of a very expensive treatment in out-of-pocket spending (an even 
less frequent scenario). This could account for the fact that those who purchase CII for cancer 
tend to focus on extremely high cost cases and purchase an income transfer far beyond the 
expected sum of out-of-pocket medical and non medical costs linked to the treatment and the 
illness. However, if prospect theory can predict that individuals cover beyond expected costs, it 
cannot predict that they cover beyond maximum costs
29
Overall, we believe this empirical test of Eeckhoudt’s model suggests that state 
dependent utility and affordability variables must be included in the model to more accurately 
reflect consumer behavior related to CII purchases.  We have based our conclusions on the 
central tendencies of aggregate data, and some sensitivity analysis using the 90
th through 50
th 
percentiles of the data and although the results are suggestive additional research is warranted 
, as appears in a majority  of our 
sensitivity analyses. It is certainly the case that more refined data at the individual level would 
allow us to test more convincingly state-dependant utility versus prospect theory.  
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to verify if our conclusions are valid. These results are intriguing but suggestive only because 
we are unable to link cancer expenditure data and income data directly to patient purchase 
behavior. Hence, we caution the reader in making causal assumptions based on the simulations 
presented in this paper.  We expect that other unmeasured or unavailable information might be 
required in order for us to better predict the demand across age and gender categories, and to 
determine what portion of these differences are accounted for by state utility transfer and 
affordability limitations. Additional research would be required to verify  these  demand 
characteristics more fully.  
We note that these results only provide information on those individuals choosing to 
purchase policies, and provide no information on those who choose not to purchase CII.  We 
expect that there are several reasons that individuals may choose not to purchase CII. The first 
reason may be regarding affordability as those with lower incomes might find that the premiums 
exceed the typical 4.5% of family income threshold. Data from the Survey of Labour and Income 
Dynamics (SLID) 2005 suggests that up to 20% of the Canadian population would be unable to 
afford the CII premiums
30. Second, others may have other healthcare insurance policies like 
disability insurance that address the larger part of their risk, namely lost income and hence 
make CII redundant or at least less attractive. We note that data from Marshall (2003) indicates 
that 56% of employees have disability insurance in Canada. Third, individuals may be unaware 
of the financial risk associated with illness as many assume that all medical costs will be 
covered through the publicly funded healthcare system and that non-medical costs will be trivial, 
although previously published work by Longo (2006, 2007) suggests otherwise. We note that if 
these populations  just described  are not considered good candidates for critical illness 
insurance the current market penetration likely represents as much as 25% of the available 
market
31
There are a number of follow-up research studies that could inform the suggested fixed-
reimbursement model. A survey of individuals who have purchased CII policies including the 
collection of information on premiums paid, family income, and face amount of their policy would 
facilitate or refute  our stated model.  Additionally follow-up work on out-of-pocket costs for 
. Again additional research might shed some light on what factors influence the choice 
of whether or not to purchase CII. 
                                                 
30  In the more specific case of those 35-54 up to 35% of individuals are ineligible due to income or health 
limitations (Personal communication Helene Michaud, Munich Re Canada) 
 
31 However, when all those beyond income restrictions are considered Munich Re estimates that only about 7% of 
the potential market currently has CII (personal communication, Helen Michaud, Dec 2008). CHRISTOPHER J LONGO 
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cancer patients that also investigates whether CII insurance  was purchased would provide 
information on whether the policy face values were sufficient or in fact exceeded the needs of 
the policyholder. It would also facilitate a better understanding of why individuals choose to 
purchase (or not) CII policies. Specific questions regarding state utility transfer and affordability 
could easily be incorporated in either of these research efforts and would help clarify whether 
either or both of these factors played a significant role in CII purchasing behavior by the insured.  
Finally we find it curious that there exists a bimodal distribution for policy face amounts.  An 
investigation to evaluate whether two distinct consumer groups exist would be informative and 
should be considered as a potential area for further research. 
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30-35 $83,226 $79,247 $68,772 62033-75510 $3,095 $335.00 $4,984 NA 0.0669%
35-40 $85,473 $163,412 $78,496 67674-89317 $3,532 $423.00 $1,126 1,868 0.0669%
40-45 $81,826 $294,048 $84,605 74616-94593 $3,807 $577.00 $5,026 9,612 0.1848%
45-50 $75,877 $378,742 $80,694 67979-93409 $3,631 $783.00 $10,610 15,765 0.1848%
50-55 $71,725 $407,781 $73,881 65629-82132 $3,325 $1,142.00 $5,962 7,870 0.6580%
55-60 $66,358 $439,792 $77,633 69339-85928 $3,493 $1,644.00 $2,339 3,612 0.6580%
60-65 $63,247 $649,888 $57,790 50508-65071 $2,601 $2,343.00 $5,896 21,262 1.7105%
Females
30-35 $74,873 $146,627 $57,995 48371-67619 $2,610 $303.00 $4,984 NA 0.1270%
35-40 $73,676 $237,267 $63,352 52067-74637 $2,851 $373.00 $1,126 1,868 0.1270%
40-45 $67,456 $167,640 $56,374 48578-64171 $2,537 $483.00 $5,026 9,612 0.3188%
45-50 $61,878 $501,497 $62,510 42999-82022 $2,813 $606.00 $10,610 15,765 0.3188%
50-55 $56,903 $413,929 $68,572 51111-78774 $3,086 $757.00 $5,962 7,870 0.6689%
55-60 $53,434 $487,586 $63,277 52714-73840 $2,847 $1,020.00 $2,339 3,612 0.6689%
60-65 $47,365 $271,258 $55,689 42470-68909 $2,506 $1,263.00 $5,896 21,262 1.1305%
1. Source; Munich Re Canada, data on file, 2001-2007
2. Liquid wealth equals net wealth less real estate equity: Source - 2005 Survey of Financial Security (Canada)
3. Data from two income families;  Source - 2005 Canadian Survey of Financial Security (Canada)
4. Premiums based on average age for category; Source - Canada Life (December 2008)
5. Cancer expenditure (both sexes); includes medical, non-medical, and travel expenditures; Source - Longo 2006,2007
6. Cancer incidence annualized; Source - National Cancer Institute of Canada 2008THE VALUE OF FIXED-REIMBURSEMENT HEALTHCARE INSURANCE – EVIDENCE FROM CANCER PATIENTS IN ONARIO, CANADA 
CHEPA WORKINGPAPER 09-03  31 
Figure 1 – CII face amount(CII), cancer expenditure (CC), income loss (IL), where 
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Figure 2 – Differences [CII-(CC+IL)] for all values using 90
th through 50
th percentiles and 
Average as reference to Figure 1 
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